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NOTE
TIPPING VIOLATIONS AND CIVIL
LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10B-5
INTRODUCTION
On August 13, 1968, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit handed down what has become, and what was
expected to be,' one of the most significant decisions in the area of
securities law rendered in the past decade.2 S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur dealt comprehensively with the expanded application of
Rule lob-5,3 promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 4 as a device to control insider trading.
Perhaps one of the most noteworthy aspects of Texas Gulf
Sulphur was its holding that "tipping"5 is a violation of Rule Iob-5. 6
It was clear at the outset from the cases interpreting Rule lob-5 that
1 See, e.g., Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The
Implications o1 the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 U. VA. L. REV. 1271 (1965) ;
Kennedy & Wander, Texas Gulf Sulphur, A Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. LAW. 1057
(1965); Mundheim, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Complaint, A Major Step in Restrict-
ing Insider Trading in Corporate Securities, 1966 J. Bus. L. 284.
2 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), affg in part and rev'g
in part, 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)
(Justice White dissenting). For commentary on the District Court decision, see, e.g.,
Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws, The Codifica-
tion Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Sw. U.L. REV. 872 (1967); Wiesen,
Disclosure of Inside Information - Materiality and Texas Gulf Sulphur, 28 MD. L.
REV. 189 (1968) ; Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.: The Inside and Outside
of Rule Iob-5, 46 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1966); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur and the Duty
of Disclosure, Another View, 55 GEo. L.J. 664 (1967); Note, Securities Transac-
tions -SEC Rule lOh-5 -Disclosure of Material Information by Corporate Stock
Optionees, 41 TUL. L. REv. 722 (1967) ; Note, Rule lOb-5 and Texas Gulf Sulphur:
An Evolution of Questions and Answers, 20 U. MiAMI L. REV. 939 (1966) ; Com-
ment, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 353 (1967); Comment, 80 HtA.v. L. REV. 468
(1966); Comment, 65 MiCH. L. REV. 944 (1967); Comment, 12 N.Y.L.F. 318
(1966). For commentary on the Circuit Court decision, see, e.g., Bromberg, Cor-
porate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and its Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731
(1968) ; Note,Scienter and Rule lob-5, 69 COLM. L. REV. 1057 (1969) ; Note, Texas
Gulf Sulphur Expanding Concepts of Corporate Disclosure Under SEC Rule lob-5,
43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 425 (1969); Note, Securities-Rule 10b-5 is Violated
Whenever an Insider Purchases Stock Without Disclosing Information that Would
Affect the Judgment of a Reasonable Investor, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 509 (1969) ; Note,
Texas Gulf Sulphur: Its Holdings and Implications, 22 VAND. L. REV. 359 (1969) ;
Comment, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 326 (1969); Comment, Inside Trading on the
Open Market: Nondisclosure and Texas Gulf Sulphur, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 309
(1969); Comment, Securities Regulation -Trading by Insiders, 10 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 755 (1969).
3 17 C.F.R. § 240. iob-5 (1969).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78a-hh-1 (1964).
5 For definitions of "tipping," see text accompanying notes 29 & 34 infra.
6 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968).
a corporate or organizational insider, who purchases or sells securities
issued by the corporation in a direct transaction with a member of
the investing public without disclosing material inside information
possessed by him, could be held in violation of lob-5 and could be
held civilly liable to the purchaser.7 It also appeared that the "tippee'' s
of such an insider would be held to be in violation of the Rule and
civilly liable, in the same manner as the corporate insider himself.'
Texas Gulf Sulphur enlarged the scope of tipping regulation one
step further in holding a tipper who did not trade in the securities
in question to be in violation of the Rule.'"
Texas Gulf Sulphur resolved some significant issues but also
raised new ones to which it did not address itself. The most important
of these is: Can civil liability be imposed on one who "tips" -i.e.,
selectively discloses material inside information to one who there-
after trades in the security in question? If so, under what circum-
stances can the "tipper" be held liable, and to what extent?
The importance of this issue is clear. A tipper who is merely
a violator of the Rule may be subject to an SEC action for injunctive
or other administrative relief." A tipper who is held civilly liable
for his violation may be subject to a multiplicity of claims for damages
suffered by those trading on the securities in question, as a result
of the tipper's violation. 2
Although a great number of factors may become involved in
considering the primary question of "tipping" violations of Rule
lob-5, four underlying questions seem to be of crucial importance
in discussing the imposition of civil liability for tipping violations:
(1) Who may be held to be subject to the Rule?
(2) What are the theoretical bases for holding "tipping" to
7 See text, section IV(C) (1) infra.
8 A "tippee" is one who receives inside information by selective disclosure in breach of
trust. However, the distinction between an "insider," as defined in the text accom-
panying note 25 infra, and a "tippee," as defined in the text accompanying notes 29
& 34 infra, is often blurred. As further discussion will point out, once a violation of
Rule 10b-5 is found, it is felt that the distinction should not be crucial in determining
the civil liability of such a person.
9See text, section IV(C)(2) infra.
10 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968).
11 "It is not necessary in a suit for equitable or phophylactic relief to establish all the
elements required in a suit for monetary damages." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir. 1968), quoting from, Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,
384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967), and SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
12 See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur - The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind In
lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 441-44 (1968).
Approximately 59 private actions have been filed against Texas Gulf Sulphur
Company, et al. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REp. 1 97,372 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1969). Only one of these
is known to have been decided on the merits at this time. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf




be a violation of the Rule and the doctrinal grounds for
imposition of civil liability therefor?
(3) In view of the fact that Rule 10b-5 requires that the pro-
hibited acts be performed "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security,"'" what types of transactions are
subject to the Rule, and what constitutes a sufficient "con-
nection with" the transaction?
(4) What additional factors must be considered in answering
the above questions in connection with a civil action for
damages, rather than an SEC action for injunctive or other
administrative relief?
This Note will analyze the primary question generally, in terms
of these four aspects of a Rule lob-5 civil action. To clarify the
considerations involved with each of the four aspects, they will be
analyzed more or less independently of each other before attempting
to determine the relationships between them and their combined
effect upon the question of liability. For this reason and to provide
the legal context in which the issues arise, the persons, the acts, and
the transactions which fall within the ambit of 10b-5 for purposes
of determining a violation, will first be considered.
I. PERSONS WHO MAY VIOLATE THE RULE
A. Insider Violations under 1 Ob-5
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942 under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 193414 and is one of many provisions
in the securities laws designed to prevent fraud.' 5 Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
13 See text of Rule quoted in text accompanying note 16 infra.
14 15 U.S.C. § 78a-hh-1 (1964).
15 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) states:
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the adoption of a
rule prohibiting fraud by any person in the connection with the purchase
of securities. The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase
of securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a
loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission
by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they
engage in fraud in their purchase.
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operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.1t
The Rule does not utilize the word "insider." Nevertheless, the
courts have interpreted Rule 10b-5 to mean "that a corporate insider
purchasing stock from an outsider must disclose any material fact
known to him by reason of his inside position but not known to
the outsider."' 7 In deciding who was to have the status of an insider,
the courts have applied the rule to officers and directors,'" and
controlling shareholders.'9 The Commission has taken the position
that any person trading unfairly in the stock of the corporation while
knowingly possessed of information unavailable to the general public
should be regarded as violating Rule lob-5.2 0 The SEC expanded
the definition of insider by developing an "access test''21 relying on
the "any person" language in the Rule." This expanded reading
of the Rule was first presented in Cady, Roberts & Co.,2 3 in which
the Commission stated:
We have already noted that the anti-fraud provisions are
phrased in terms of "any person" and that a special obligation has
been traditionally required of corporate insiders, e.g., officers,
directors and controlling stockholders. These three groups, however,
do not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an
obligation. Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal ele-
ments; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and
16 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1969).
17 Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
1
8 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965) ; Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Northern Trust Co. v.
Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Il. 1952); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rehearing on other grounds, 73
F. Supp. 798, modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947).
19 Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966) ; Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa.
1950).
20 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). See also Comment, Liability for
Failure to Disclose Under Rule 10-b-5, 20 STAN. L. REv. 347, 352-53 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Failure to Disclose].
21 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). See also Bromberg, Corporate
Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Bromberg, TGS].
Bromberg states:
The SEC laid down an "access test" which treats as an insider anyone with
a relationship to an issuer giving access, directly or indirectly, to infor-
mation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose of the issuer.
The test was adopted by both lower and upper courts in TGS, and was
described by the latter as "the essence of Rule 10b-5."
Id. at 739.
22 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). See also Comment, Insider Liability
Under Securities Exchange Act Rule lob-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U.
CHr. L. REv. 121, 131 (1962); Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts,
17 Bus. LAw. 939, 947-53 (1962).
2 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advan-
tage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing. In considering these elements under the broad
language of the anti-fraud provisions we are not to be circumscribed
'by fine distinctions and rigid classifications. Thus our task here is
to identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a
company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer cor-
relative duties in trading in its securities.
2 4
The "access test" thus defines or treats as an insider anyone
who has a relationship to a corporation and either directly or indi-
rectly is given access to information intended for corporate purposes. 5
The courts seem to be willing to accept this expanded definition.26
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,27 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, speaking of the access test, stated:
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own
account in the securities of a corporation has "access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone" may
not take "advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing," i.e., the investing public.
2 8
The door is thus opened for liability extending to many persons who
receive inside information from the corporation.
B. First Generation Tippees
Tipping is generally "the selective disclosure of material inside
(nonpublic) information for trading or other personal purposes.
' 29
The first case finding a lOb-5 violation by a tippee was Cad),
Roberts & Co.,3 ° which was also the first case applying the "access
test.""' Gintel, a partner in the broker-dealer firm, was given infor-
mation by Cowdin, a director of Curtiss-Wright, prior to its public
release. Upon receiving this information, Gintel called his associate
at Cady, Roberts, and instructed him to buy Curtiss-Wright stock.
In its opinion, the Commission stated: "Cowdin's relationship to
the company clearly prohibited him from selling the securities af-
fected by the information without disclosure. By logical sequence,
24 Id. at 912 (footnotes omitted).
25 id.
2 See material quoted in note 21 supra.
27401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
2 Id. at 848 (footnote omitted).
2A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAWS: FRAUD-SEC RULE lob-5 § 7.5(2) (1969)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG, FRAUD]. For a discussion of the obligation of tippees
to disclose, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1451 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Loss].
3040 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
31 See note 24 supra and accompanying text. It is possible that Cady, Roberts & Co. is
more properly classified as an insider under the "access test." See note 10 supra
and text accompanying note 25 supra. However, Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), cited Cady, Roberts & Co. for the proposition that tippees are
subject to the same duty as insiders. Id. at 410.
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it should prohibit Gintel, a partner of registrant. This prohibition
extends not only over his own account, but to selling for dis-
cretionary accounts and soliciting and executing other orders.""2
More force was added to the prohibition against trading by tippees
in Ross v. Licht.3 3 The court in that case defined tippees as "persons
given information by insiders in breach of trust .... .3. Although
this was a civil action brought under Rule lob-5, a finding of
violation by the "tippees" is implicit 5 in the court's holding that the
"tippees" were civilly liable. " Also, the court's opinion in Texas
Gulf Sulphur stated that an insider will be found in violation for
"tipping," and intimates that tippees would be found to be in
violation, as well, because their conduct could be as reprehensible
as the insider's.
3 7
C. Subsequent Generation Tippees
An expansion of the tippee concept is that of the tippee's tippee.
If an insider has told another, thus making the other a tippee, then
that tippee may in turn disclose this information to still another,
making him a second generation tippee. Information travels rapidly
and may reach many ears after it has been initially divulged. Thus,
in a matter of hours the number of subsequent generation tippees
could be large. A 10b-5 violation has not yet been found on the
part of subsequent generation tippees, but the possibility is not
remote.
The question which must be resolved relates to how far the
disclosures can go in the ladder of tippees and still be a violation of
10b-5. Bromberg suggests that "not all tippees are in the same
position."'Ss He proposes the following criteria for determining a
tippee's violation: "A tippee violates if he (1) trades with specific
material information which he knows (or should reasonably know)
comes from an inside source and (2) knows (or should reasonably
know) that the information is undisclosed to the public.'' 3 9 Such a
test might be an answer to the problem of avoiding a finding of
violation on the part of remote tippees who may not be cognizant
of the quality of their information.
32 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted).
3 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
341d. at 410.
35 In order to find someone civilly liable under iob-5, there must, of course, be a
violation of the Rule.
36 Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). This holding is somewhat
weakened by the fact that the court also held the "tippees" liable on the alternative
ground of aiding and abetting a violation of lob-5.
37 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 853 (2d Cir. 1968).
38 Bromberg, TGS, supra note 21, at 747.
3 9Id. at 749.
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I[. TIPPING AS A VIOLATION OF THE RULE
The above discussion has focused primarily on the question of
finding a violation of Rule 10b-5 on the part of certain classes of
persons, particularly tippees, when such persons trade in the stock
in question. However, the question here under consideration involves
a tipper who does not trade in the stock. Civil liability, if any, must
be based upon the act of tipping - selective disclosure to a tippee"
who trades in the stock. The status of tipping as a violation of 10b-5
will be briefly considered here.
Perhaps the classic and most common tipping situation is that
suggested by the Cady, Roberts case.4" In that case a partner of
Cady, Roberts & Co., a broker-dealer firm, received material inside
information from an insider of the issuer of the securities in question.
The partner thus became a tippee or "first generation tippee" of the
insider. Although the Cady, Roberts decision held that such a tippee
was prohibited from trading the securities affected by the information
not only for his own account, but for discretionary accounts as well,41
the "first generation tippee" (broker-dealer) could just as well have
passed the inside information on to the discretionary accounts or
other preferred customers ("second generation tippees"), thus allow-
ing them to trade the securities based upon the inside information.
The problem is one of deciding what action was permitted the
broker-dealer on receipt of the corporate information. Superior
knowledge in the field of securities and a greater understanding
in the interpretation of information received are the skills of a
broker. Yet, does the broker have the duty to disclose all information
he receives to his customers? In Cady, Roberts, Commissioner Cary
answered the question negatively by stating:
While Gintel [the broker] undoubtedly occupied a fiduciary
relationship to his customers, this relationship could not justify any
actions by him contrary to law. Even if we assume the existence of
conflicting fiduciary obligations, there can be no doubt which is
primary here. On these facts, clients may not expect of a broker
the benefits of his inside information at the expense of the public
generally.42
Although the Cady, Roberts case itself involved a trading viola-
tion by a tippee, the recent Texas Gulf Sulphur case squarely held
tipping to be a violation of Rule lob-5.
43
4040 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
41 id. at 912.
42 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). See also Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule
iob-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 121, 155 (1962).
4SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968). See also SEC v.
Glen Alden Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 4080, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,280 (S.D.N.Y. August 7, 1968).
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It is interesting to note that the disclosure problem of broker-
dealers is not confined to the infrequent receipt of "tips" from cor-
porate insiders. Broker-dealers frequently undertake to underwrite
a securities issue of a corporation, thus becoming an insider of the
issuer having special access to inside information. In this situation,
if the broker does not have a primary duty to disclose to his
clients the information he receives, what procedure should be em-
ployed when he receives such information?4 4 Three alternatives seem
to exist. He could disclose to the public the information he possesses;
he could refrain from trading in the stock and from disclosing the
information to others until the corporation disseminates this infor-
mation; or underwriting departments could be kept entirely separate
from sales departments.
Complications arise in using either of the first two alternatives.
First, most brokerage firms do not possess the facilities to dis-
seminate this information quickly to the public.45 Also, dissemination
by the broker (who is also an underwriter) may violate his duty to
the corporation.46 It has been suggested that if a broker were to
reveal the information to all of his clients to their satisfaction, this
would relieve him from liability.47 However, it has been held that
when specific antifraud sections are violated, it is not a defense that
all the broker's clients are content.48 This is justified on the grounds
that the broker's duty is to the general public and is not limited
to his clients.49
There are also problems in using the second alternative - pro-
hibiting the broker from making a market in securities about
which he possesses inside information. If a client should request
to sell the specific stock, and the broker must reply that he is unable
to trade that stock this week, the broker's function may be sub-
stantially impaired. One author suggests that the refusal to trade
may deter legitimate investments." ° Loss, on the other hand, states
that "a broker or dealer who becomes a corporate insider must
44 See Note, Civil Liability Under Section lOB And Rule lob-5: A Suggestion For
Replacing The Doctrine O Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 675 (1965). See also Cary,
Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CAL. L. REV. 408, 415 '(1962). The broker
should not be permitted to remain silent, while continuing to deal in the security,
"by reason of the inherent unfairness involved where a person takes advantage of
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing." Id.
4See Comment, 75 H~Av. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1962).
4" 3 Loss, supra note 29, at 1453.
47 Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
8Id.
49 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961); Comment, Insider Liability Under
Securities Exchange Act Rule 1ob-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CL L. REv.
121, 155-58 (1962).
50 Failure to Disclose, supra note 20, at 356.
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assume the risk that his duty to the corporation may sometimes pre-
vent him from making a market in its securities."51
The third alternative appears to be the most satisfactory. By
keeping the underwriting and sales departments entirely separate,
the problem of conflicting interests may be alleviated by preventing
the information from reaching the point at which it could be used
in trading in violation of the Rule.
52
It is worthy of note that this problem is not unique to under-
writing and sales departments of brokerage firms. Similar problems
exist as to attorneys, C.P.A.'s, banks, 3 and financial specialists. They
are in constant contact with corporations and have access to inside
information. Speaking to the question of who may be an insider,
the court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.5 4 stated: "Thus, anyone
in possession of material inside information must either disclose it
to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in
order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so,
must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities con-
cerned while such inside information remains undisclosed."55 Under
the court's ruling, if an attorney, accountant, or bank were to relay
his corporate information to another or trade in the stock, he would
be in violation of Rule lob-5. In normal circumstances, a means to
avoid liability would be to disclose to the public the information.
However, in the case of this select group, such disclosure would
frequently constitute a breach of their fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration. Thus the only course of action open to these individuals,
once they receive the corporate confidence, is to refrain from trading
in or recommending the stock while the information is undisclosed.
Financial specialists, however, present a somewhat different
problem. They are theoretically not allowed access to the corporate
confidences, yet, due to their expertise in the evaluation of infor-
mation, a fact not material to the general public may have high
significance to the specialist. The SEC, in Cady, Roberts, stated that
'perceptive analysis of generally known facts" would not constitute
a violation of the Rule.5"
Sections I and II above have presented part of the legal context
in which the questions raised at the beginning of this Note must
51 3 Loss, supra note 29, at 1453 (footnote omitted).
52 The Commission has taken this position in its Statement of Policy appended as
Exhibit A to its ruling Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner & Smith, Inc., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8459, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 77,629, at 83,351 (SEC November 25, 1968).
53 See generally, Harfield, Texas Gulf Sulphur and Bank Internal Procedures Between
the Trust and Commercial Departments, 86 BANKING L.J. 869 (1969).
54 401 F.2d 833 '(2d Cir. 1968).
5 Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
5
6 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 915 (1961).
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be considered. It appears that Rule lOb-5 has been extended to
first generation tippees who trade in the securities in question.
Coverage may be extended to subsequent generation tippees who
trade in the securities. The focus of this Note, however, is directed
to the question of whether such a person can be held civilly liable
for tipping- selective disclosure to a subsequent generation tippee
who trades in the stock. Although tipping has been found to be
within the prohibition of Rule lob-5, the resolution of the question
of civil liability for such acts depends upon certain legal consid-
erations to be discussed in subsequent sections of this Note.
III. TRANSACTIONS SUBJECT TO THE RULE
Securities transactions have traditionally fallen into two cate-
gories:
(1) direct face-to-face transactions in which the parties have an
opportunity to disclose to one another anything that may be
required;
(2) indirect or market transactions in which the parties have
no direct dealings and may make representations and dis-
closures only indirectly through the public media.
Rule 10b-5 case law developed initially in direct transactions, but
courts gradually have begun to find 10b-5 violations in indirect
transaction cases.57 This section will address itself to a brief survey
of the cases finding violations in both types of transactions. It will
not be the purpose of this section to analyze all of the developments
concerning transaction violations, but to establish a point of reference
for a discussion of civil liability in various transaction situations
discussed in section IV of this Note.
A. Direct Transactions
Direct transactions may be of varied types. For example, when a
seller holding stock in a closed corporation sells directly to a pur-
chaser, without using a broker, nondisclosure of a material fact in
connection with such a transaction, while disclosing other facts, is a
violation of the second clause of Rule 10b-5. 58 Another example of
a direct transaction violation is a broker failing to disclose a material
fact during negotiations with his customer.5" A survey of the myriad
5 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
S8Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) rehearing on
other grounds, 73 F. Supp. 798, modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947)
(where failure to disclose the possibility of a sale of corporate assets during negoti-
ations was held a violation).
59 Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C. 311 (1952) (holding a broker in violation for




of direct transactions is beyond the scope of this Note, and the area
has been thoroughly explored by Professor Bromberg.60 Suffice it
to say that direct transactions are clearly within the scope of Rule
lob-5.6 x Furthermore, in private 10b-5 actions based on direct trans-
actions of all types, the courts will entertain the suit, acknowledging
that privity and the other requirements based upon the relationship
of the parties to the transaction are present.62
B. Indirect Transactions
The typical indirect transaction is the open market purchase,
where the seller has no face-to-face contact with the purchaser. While
early cases involved direct transactions, the Cady, Roberts and Texas
Gulf Sulphur decisions set precedents for market transaction
violations. " The SEC in Cady, Roberts stated that "[njeither the
statutes nor Rule 10b-5 establish artificial walls of responsibility,"64
in applying the Rule to a market transaction violation. In Texas
Gulf Sulphur the Second Circuit cited the Cady, Roberts decision
with approval in holding the corporate defendant in possible violation
of the Rule for trading in an indirect transaction.6"
In another administrative action, 6 the Commission has taken
the position that a 10b-5 violation can be found where the registrant,
a broker-dealer, did not trade in the market itself, but effected trans-
actions in the market for its preferred customers based on inside
information.
7
The discussion of civil liability in the next section of this Note
will assume, for purposes of analysis, a violation of lob-5.68
IV. CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER THE RULE
Prior discussion has focused upon the questions of whether or
not a "tipper" can be found to be in violation of Rule 10b-5 for
selectively disclosing material inside information to subsequent gen-
eration tippees who thereafter trade in the securities, and whether
60 BROMBERG, FRAUD, supra note 29, §§ 4.1-6.6.
61 Id.
62 Id.
83 Early cases brought for broker violations of 10b-5 raised the issue of indirect trans-
action violation but did not resolve the issue due to decisions on other grounds.
Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 '(E.D. Pa. 1947); Hughes & Treat, 22 S.E.C.
623 (1946).
40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961).
65 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
66 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8459, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,629 (SEC Novem-
ber 25, 1968).
6
7 Id. at 83,349.
"The reader who seeks a detailed discussion of indirect transaction violations will
find such a discussion in BROMBERG, FRAUD, supra note 29, §§ 7.1-7.6.
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or not such a violation can be found where the tippee trades in an
indirect transaction. Assuming that a violation can be found in such
a situation, the remaining discussion will center on the question of
whether or not civil liability can arise from these situations, and, if
so, what is or ought to be the extent of liability? The analysis here
will be in terms of the distinctions drawn in the first three sections
of this Note.
A. The Development of a Theory of Liability
Rule lob-5 does not specifically provide for a private cause
of action for a violation of its provisions. Sections 12(2)"' and
17(a)70 of the Securities Act of 1933, and section 16(b)7 1 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also relate to the regulation of
insider securities transactions, but have not been utilized to protect
the outsider to the same extent as Rule lob-5.72
Civil liability under lob-5 began, and is presently based on an
implied right of recovery. 73 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.74 was
an early case establishing insider civil liability based on a tort theory
that violation of a statute (section lob) makes the actor liable in
a private action for injury to another.7" Some decisions have attached
69 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964). The relevant portion of section
12 states:
Any person who -
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the
provisions of section 3, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a)
thereof) [by the use of interstate commerce] . . . by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing
of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden
of proof that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable
to the person purchasing such security from him . . . . (Emphasis
added).
This section, in imposing civil liability for violations similar to lob-5 violations,
seems to be the logical statutory provision under which an action for misrepresen-
tation would be brought by a purchaser under the securities laws. Nevertheless,
10b-5 has found more favor as a remedial cause of action. It may be surmised that
this is so because of the scienter criteria stated in section 12(2), because of the early
expansion of Rule i0b-5 liability by the courts, and because lob-5 provides a remedy
for the seller as well as for the purchaser. See text accompanying notes 80 & 81 infra.
7 0 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964). This section reads very nearly the
same are Rule lob-5.
71 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
72 Note that section 16(b) is rather restrictive in limiting liability to corporate offi-
cers, directors and principal stockholders who sell within 6 months of date of pur-
chase. Thus, its utility as a pervasive antifraud provision is similarly restricted.
73 For a discussion of the development of an implied right of recovery see BROMBERG,
FaAUD, supra note 29, § 2.4(1).
74 69 F. Supp. 512 '(E.D. Pa. (1946), rehearing on other grounds, 73 F. Supp. 798.
modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947).
7 Id. at 513.
1969
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
liability based on the theory that section 29(b) of the Exchange
Act7 6 makes a contract consummated in contravention of section
10(b) voidable at the option of the innocent party. 77 The existence
of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 is now well
established. 8
Less established has been the right of a buyer to sue under the
Rule. Early decisions79 did not recognize the right of recovery by
a defrauded buyer, though the Kardon case8 0 had previously per-
mitted recovery by a defrauded seller. More recent decisions have
permitted a buyer to bring suit under Rule lob-5. s1 Thus, case law
has developed the notion that private causes of action by defrauded
buyers or sellers may be brought under Rule lob-5.
B. Doctrines Limiting Liability
Where 10b-5 cases have been prosecuted by the SEC, the only
showing necessary for injunctive or other relief has been a violation
of the Rule. 2 However, when private litigants initially brought suits
under iob-5, the notion of privity came to the forefront, along with
materiality, reliance, and causation as the elements of common law
deceit. In private actions, the courts felt that there must be some
relationship between the defendant's violation of the Rule and the
plaintiff's injury to permit recovery." This requirement was de-
scribed in 1951 as "[a] semblance of privity between the vendor and
purchaser of the security ...."" Since 1951 the trend has been
away from requiring any direct dealings between plaintiff and
76 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1964).
77 Bromberg discusses the development of the notion of statutory voidability in
BROMBERG, FRAUD, supra note 29, § 2.4(1) (b).
78 Ten of the eleven courts of appeal have recognized a private cause of action.
See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) ; 6 Loss, supra note 29, at 3871-73;
Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 649 (1954), and authorities cited therein.
79Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
80 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rehearing on
other grounds, 73 F. Supp. 798, modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947).
81 Doelle v. Ireco Chemicals, 391 F.2d 6, 9 (10th Cir. 1968); Stevens v. Vowell,
343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961);
Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964). The Ellis
case specifically considered the development of the notion of a buyer's right to
recovery concluding that such right was concomitant with that of a seller. Ellis v.
Carter, supra at 272-74.
8 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914-15 (1961). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 77,629
at 83,345 n.5 (SEC November 25, 1968).
8 See text accompanying note 112 infra.
8 Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), alf'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). See also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). For an interesting discussion of what is meant
by the term "semblance of privity," see H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIEs LAW 600
(1966).
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defendant.8 5 Decisions in the Second and Sixth Circuits have mini-
mized the importance of privity between plaintiff and defendant
in private actions .8  The current approach seems to be that absence
of privity "does not amount to a fatal defect of proof.""7
A requirement that a defendant only be sued by those to whom
he sold or from whom he bought has the advantage of limiting
potential damages. If the class of potential plaintiffs is expanded to
include all persons who bought or sold in the market, the possibility
of recoveries against one defendant for an amount greater than the
damages caused by his own transactions greatly increases.88 This
would be possible because once a causal link is established to one
plaintiff in the market, a similar link could be found with many
other potential plaintiffs in the same position. One way to avoid
this pitfall would be to limit the plaintiffs' recovery to the amount
of the defendant's profit. But such an approach would cause other
problems such as a rush to get an early execution of judgment before
the defendant's liability limit was reached.
On the opposite side of this question there is the argument that
equating plaintiffs' recovery to defendant's profit would mean that
plaintiffs could have no cause of action where the defendant did
not make a profit. This would seem to be contrary to the intent of
the Rule and to holdings that a person may be in violation of 10b-5
even when he loses money in the transaction.89 Elimination of a sig-
nificant avenue of recourse in 10b-5 private actions in this manner
would decrease their deterrent effect.90
If materiality of the information is assumed and privity is
found present, factors such as causation and reliance are assumed to
be present.91 When privity limitations on the relationship between
85Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb.5: A Suggestion for
Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 663 n.31 (1965).
86Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Brown v.
Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
But see Kuenhert v. Tekstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1969).
87 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also
3 Loss, supra note 29, at 1767-71; 6 Loss, supra note 29, at 3896; BROMBERG,
FRAUD, supra note 29, § 8.5 n.28.
88See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind
In Rule 1Ob-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 441-44 (1968).
89 [W]e are not convinced of any difference in substance between a successful fraud
and an attempt. The statutory phrase 'any manipulative or deceptive device,' 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b), seems broad enough to encompass conduct irrespective of its out-
come." Kuenhert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969).
90 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 '(1964). The Borak case, a section 14
Exchange Act case, lends judicial sanction to the notion that private actions have a
strong position in the scheme of federal securities laws and that appropriate civil
remedies should be provided to effect the purpose of these laws.
91 Note, Civil Liability Under Section 1ob and Rule lOb-5: A Suggestion For Replacing
The Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 684-85 (1965) ; Ruder, Texas Gulf
Sulphur- The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase
and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 433-34 (1968).
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the parties were removed, these other factors were looked to inde-
pendently in order to establish (or limit) liability." It is the
development of causation and reliance and to a lesser extent for-
seeability as tests of liability, and specifically their application to
insider and tippee violations involving market transactions, that will
be discussed in the following subsections.
C. Civil Liability in Direct Transactions
It is now seen that in order to sustain a private civil action
under Rule lob-5, a plaintiff must not only show a violation of
lob-5, but must also show some sort of relationship between his loss
and the defendant's violation - whether this relationship be couched
in terms of a concept of privity or a formulation for causation and
reliance or foreseeability.98 The remainder of this analysis will con-
sider this theory of civil liability in terms of the distinctions delineated
in sections I, II, and III of this Note.
1. Corporate Insiders
A face-to-face transaction between an insider acting in violation
of Rule 10b-5 and an innocent purchaser has generally been held
to result in insider civil liability. For example, when the purchaser
of securities in a direct transaction is the deceiving party (though
incomplete disclosure or nondisclosure), and the seller, in reliance94
on the presumed full disclosure of the purchaser, suffers damage,
liability of the purchaser ensues. 5 The courts, whether through a
theory of tort liability96 or statutory voidability of the transaction,97
have permitted recovery in these direct transactions. 8
92Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in
Rule iob-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 434 n.61 (1968); see
text accompanying note 112 infra.
93 The element of "scienter," which is also arguably necessary to sustain liability in
iob-5 cases, will not be considered in this analysis. For a general discussion of
"scienter" in 1ob-5 civil actions, see Veber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) and authorities cited therein.
94 "Reliance is an essential element of a cause of action under Rule lob-5." Ross v.
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
9Id. at 411; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rehearing on other grounds, 73 F.
Supp. 798, modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947).
"Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964) ; Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rehearing on other grounds,
73 F. Supp. 798, modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947).
7 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rehearing on
other grounds, 73 F. Supp. 798, modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (1947).
The Kardon case also discussed the alternative holding that the contract involved
in the transaction would be voidable under section 29 of the Exchange Act.
9A recent decision has permitted recovery also where the corporate insider failed to
disclose material information to existing shareholders of the corporation. Reynolds
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,494, (Civil No. 132-66)
D. Utah Oct. 17, 1969).
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2. First Generation Tippees
While the language of Rule 10b-5 refers to "any person" who
"directly or indirectly" engages in certain acts,'9 early cases required
privity - similar to privity in contract law - in the transaction be-
tween plaintiff and defendant to sustain a private cause of action.100
Though the requirement of privity has been generally obviated,'
the notion retains some validity here in a discussion of tippee liability
in a direct transaction. In a face-to-face transaction where a first
generation tippee sells directly to or purchases directly from a party,
privity of contract is present. Certainly a tippee in such a situation,
being under the same duty as an insider,1 °2 and meeting the criteria
of the Rule as "any person," should be a logical person to hold
liable in a private 10b-5 action. Notions of statutory tort liability
and statutory voidability are applicable to such a tippee who is the
violator of the Rule.1 3 Ross v. Licht was a private action where
tippee liability was mentioned but was not the sole ground for
imposing liability. The court noted that "[i]f Sidney Grapel and
Bluestone were not insiders, they would seem to have been 'tippees'
(persons given information by insiders in breach of trust) and
subject to the same duty as insiders.
' '1
04
More recently, the Fifth Circuit, in a private action involving a
tippee who had violated Rule 10b-5 has noted that "tippees...
present the same threat to the investigating public as do insiders
.... 105 Although this case involved the denial of recovery to a
tippee seeking redress from a tipper for giving a false tip, the court
said in dictum that if the information had been true, the lippee
would, "of course, be liable to his vendors or vendees ....106
While the courts have not considered tippee liability in direct
transactions to any great degree, the reasoning of the Ross case is
persuasive in extending liability in a private action to such persons.'0 7
3. Subsequent Generation Tippees
A tippee's tippee who violates Rule 10b-5 should stand in
much the same position, insofar as civil liability is concerned, as
9 See text accompanying notes 16 and 22 supra.
1W See, e.g., Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), arfd 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (requiring some "semblance
of privity").
01 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Texas
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14, 24 (W.D.
Ky. 1960). But see Kuenhert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 702 '(5th Cir. 1969).
102 Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See 3 Loss, supra note 29,
at 1451.
103 See BROMBERG, FRAuD, supra note 29, § 2.4(1) (a-b).
104 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
105 Kuenhert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 1969).
106 Id.
107 See Bromberg, TGS, supra note 21, at 749.
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the tippee himself. No case law has been found, however, sustaining
such liability.' 0 8 Nevertheless, the purpose of protecting the investing
public from unfair inequalities in bargaining power would be fur-
thered if liability were imposed on a subsequent generation tippee in
a direct transaction. 109 Similarly, the fact that privity exists in a
direct transaction sustains this theory of liability. Unlike the indirect
transaction,11 ° the extension of liability to persons who materially
misrepresent in a face-to-face transaction does not raise the question
of holding persons liable whose acts in fact have no causal relation
to the losses of the innocent party. In this context it should not
ordinarily matter how a defendant received his inside information,
but only that in a transaction with the plaintiff he failed to disclose
such information. Certainly the defendant falls within the meaning
of the Rule's criterion of "any person."
4. Persons Subject to Civil Liability in Direct Transactions
In summary, it appears that persons who violate Rule 10b-5
through direct transactions may also be subject to civil liability for
the violation. The requirement of privity can easily be met by the
plaintiff who has traded directly with the person who has violated
Rule lob-5. However, as indicated in section I of this Note, sub-
sequent generation tippees have not yet been held to be in violation
of the Rule.
D. Civil Liability in Indirect Transactions
As mentioned in section III(B) supra, the courts have recently
extended the scope of application of Rule 10b-5 to include indirect
transactions for purposes of determining a violation of the Rule.
For purposes of finding civil liability under lob-5, however, the
fact that the transaction involved is indirect is significant. It will
have a decisive effect in determining the existence of privity - or
causation and reliance - which is necessary in a civil action under
the Rule. Certainly privity is not present between a plaintiff and a
defendant who have traded the same security in an impersonal
market. However, the requirement of privity has not been emphasized
in recent decisions. The courts have, rather, looked to the elements
of reliance or causation in order to find a connection between a de-
fendant's violation of 10b-5 and a plaintiff's losses. The status of
1
08However, the Cady, Roberts opinion suggests such liability when it states: "Section
17 and Rule iob-5 apply to securities transactions by any person. Misrepresentations
will lie within their ambit, no matter who the speaker may he." Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (emphasis added).
109 The Cady, Roberts opinion indicates that the purpose of the antifraud provisions is
to prevent the taking of undue advantage of investors and others. Id.
110 See section IV(D) infra.
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concepts limiting civil liability under Rule 10b-5 has been well sum-
marized by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:"'.
[A] requirement of privity was at first suggested... but has more
recently 'been ignored .... However, the search for limiting doctrine
has continued. Thus, some courts have looked to see whether a
plaintiff actually relied on the allegedly fraudulent statement,
whether such reliance was reasonable, whether the fraud actually
caused harm to the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff's injury was
foreseeable, and whether plaintiff falls within the category of
buyer or seller of securities. l12
This subsection will consider briefly the application of these
various limiting doctrines to a violation of lob-5 occurring in con-
nection with an indirect or market transaction.
1. Causation and Reliance
In Barnett v. Anaconda Co.,1 1 the court stated that in order
to sustain a claim under section 10(b) there must be "at least some
causal relationship to the damage complained of."' 14 It has been
suggested, though not held, that the causal relationship should be
one of proximate cause." 5 Whether characterized as proximate cause
or not, the question of causation is one of ultimate fact.1
Without any further refinement of the test of causation, a find-
ing of a causal relationship between a person who violates Rule
lob-5 by nondisclosure or selective disclosure of inside information
in connection with a market transaction and a person who has traded
the stock in the same market would be difficult at best, because in
an indirect transaction there is no face-to-face contact or communi-
cation between plaintiff and defendant.
In List v. Fashion Park, Inc." 7 the court did refine the test
of causation when it discussed the requirement that reliance be
placed on the misrepresentation in a civil suit under Rule lob-5." 8
After equating the reliance requirement with the principle of causa-
tion in fact,"' the court set forth the following test: "T]he proper
test is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act dif-
ferently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the
1I Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
12 Id. at 543-44 (citations and footnotes omitted) ; see also section IV(B) supra.
113 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
114I. at 775. See also West v. Zurhorst, 280 F. Supp. 574, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Miller v. Stein-
bach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Cf. Weber v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp.
201, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
115 Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1956); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F.
Supp. 766, 775 n.6 '(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
116 West v. Zurhorst, 280 F. Supp. 574, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
117 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).




undisclosed fact." ' This test has been followed by a number of
courts,' and although it was originally formulated in a direct
transaction case, its potential application to an indirect transaction
case would not be beyond the bounds of logic. If the duty upon an
insider or tippee trading in a security is to make his inside information
public,' and the plaintiff can show that he would have acted
lOld. (citations omitted). This test has been characterized as a constructive reliance
test, applicable to cases of nondisclosure. That is, plaintiff would have relied had
he been informed. Note, Insider Trading on the Open Market: Nondisclosure and
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 309, 322 (1969).
It has been suggested that the court did not properly phrase its test question.
"[W]hat the court should have been asking in List was whether the plaintiff would
have sold if defendants had refrained from trading, not whether he would have sold
if defendants had disclosed." Note, Insiders' Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 78 YALE
L.J. 864, 871 (1969). This attack on the test is derived from the premise that the
"formula's basic defect is its implicit assumption that insiders are subject to an
unconditional duty to disclose." Id. at 870. Although this attack on the List test
is appropriate in some fact situations, the situation under consideration here involves
selective disclosure rather than partial disclosure or nondisclosure. See note 124 infra.
The fact that selective disclosure is involved has significance for two reasons. First,
it establishes an apparent violation of at least the Rule's intent to have all segments
of the investing public equally informed. Second, such selective disclosure should
take away any defense based on the business judgment rule's implication that total
secrecy is a matter for determination by the corporation without interference from
the courts. Clearly these business reasons that dictate secrecy cannot be agued to
exist if part of the public has already been told. See Note, Civil Liability Under
Section lob and Rule lob-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine ot Privity,
74 YALE L.J. 658, 677 (1965). Although the List test may assume the disclosure
requirement, if the duty to disclose exists independently of the test, the test should
be applicable.
121 See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967); Vanderboom v.
Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1178, 1193 (W.D. Ark. 1969).
122See note 120 and text accompanying note 55 supra. The recent case of Reynolds v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,494 (Civil No. 132-66) (D.
Utah Oct. 16, 1969), appears to support the conclusion that the List test can be
applied to cases of nondisclosure in connection with indirect transactions, where a
duty to disclose can be found. In considering the claims of Plaintiff Karlson, the
court said:
Plaintiff Karlson sold his stock on December 11, 1963, through a stock
exchange. There was no face-to-face transaction. Fogarty did not purchase
the particular shares sold by Karlson. While it is not necessary for Karlson
to establish privity of contract in order to recover for violations of the
statute or rule, and the fact that there was a total non-disclosure would
not prevent recovery if some form of manipulation was involved [citing List
v. Fashion Park, Inc.], it nevertheless is necessary for Karlson to prove
some causative connection between Fogarty's actions or omissions and the
damage Karlson claims he suffered. The court finds no such causative
effect.
Id. at 98,314 (footnotes omitted). The court goes on to explain the lack of causation
in terms of the fact that the duty which the corporation owes to its stockholders to
keep them reasonably informed as to corporate affairs does not surpass all other duties
owed to stockholders: For instance, the duty to not make information concerning the
mineral discovery public until the company could first protect itself by acquiring
mineral interests in adjoining lands. The court concluded that "it is not necessary
to pass upon the materiality of the information available to defendants on December
11, 1963, because of his findings that there was no duty at that time on the part of
either defendant to disclose the information then available with respect to drilling
results, and that Fogarty's violations of the statute and the rule by purchasing TGS
stock did not cause any damage to Plaintiff Karlson." Id. at 98,314 (emphasis added).
Although the court denied recovery to Plaintiff Karlson for nondisclosure where there
was no duty to disclose, other plaintiffs in this case recovered on the basis of the
false and misleading press release issued in connection with the indirect transactions
involved in the case. Id.
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differently than he did had he been informed prior to his market
transaction, then it can be said that the defendant's failure to dis-
close the information - his violation of lob-5 - caused the injury
to plaintiff.
2. Privity or "Semblance" Thereof
Few cases, however, have actually sustained a private cause of
action for a violation of Rule 10b-5 in connection with an indirect
or market transaction, and judges faced with a claim that lob-5
liability should be imposed in indirect transactions have wrestled
with the requirement of privity or a "semblance" thereof.
In one such case, Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co.,"' the situation
was that the plaintiff's claim involved misrepresentation by false
or misleading statements in connection with an indirect transaction,
rather than selective disclosure.. 4 or nondisclosure of material inside
information. The court dismissed the privity requirement but appeared
to rely on the fact that the alleged misstatements (financial state-
ments) were intended for public information and to induce the
public to buy securities.'12 The court also found reliance on the
alleged misstatements and concluded that the registrant's accounting
firm could be liable regardless of whether it had benefited from
the supposedly inflated market price.
126
It is possible to suggest that privity, or rather a "semblance"
thereof, deserves rehabilitation as a limiting doctrine in the context
of indirect or market transactions. Professor Bloomenthal discusses,
with reference to the "faceless" transaction, the relationship of a
defendant's intent to induce action to the requirement of privity
in terms of foreseeability:
The key to what the [United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, per Judge Sugarman, speaking in Joseph v.
Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.,127 ] meant by "semblance of
privity" can perhaps be found in its quotation from Judge Frank's
opinion in [Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,128s suggesting that
the plaintiff amend his complaint so as to allege that the corporation
made false statements for the purpose of inducing the plaintiffs
to purchase the common stock in the market. On this basis the
12 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. I1. 1967).
124 It should be noted that there is a difference between selective and partial disclosure.
Selective disclosure is disclosure of information to some but not all, while partial
disclosure is a disclosure of some but not all facts to the same person or persons.
The former is akin to nondisclosure in that the public is denied information provided
to select individuals; the latter is the substance of a iob-5 violation in that the
partial nondisclosure makes the disclosed information false or misleading.
1
25Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 104 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
126 Id. at 104-05.
12799 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y.), affd 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
1288 F.2d 783, 788 (2d Cir. 1951).
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required semblance of privity would be present if the issuer or
insiders made false statements which they intended to (or could
have foreseen would) be relied upon by others purchasing the
security in the market even though the issuer or insiders themselves
were not selling the particular shares being purchased. Conceiveably,
this could be extended to cover the failure to disclose material
information and could be equally applicable to false or misleading
statements or failure to disclose material facts intended to (or
which could have been foreseen would) induce persons to sell the
particular security.1 29
Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., much cited
and maligned 3 ' - for its requirement that 10b-5 liability cannot
be found in the absence of at least a "semblance of privity," may
actually be enunciating a requirement which is not practically dif-
ferentiable from the classic requirement of proximate cause con-
necting a plaintiff's loss and the misrepresentation of defendant.
According to Prosser,
[TJhe damage upon which a deceit action rests must have been
'proximately caused" by the misrepresentation. So far as the fact
of causation is concerned, any loss which follows upon a transaction
into which the misstatement induces the plaintiff to enter may be
said to be caused by it; but the same considerations which limit
liability in cases of tangible harm have operated here. In general,
with only a few execptions, the courts have restricted recovery to
those damages which might foreseeably be expected to follow from
the character of the misrepresentation itself.'
3 '
Analogizing the Federal tort law of Rule 10b-5 to the common
law of deceit, the List test of reliance - would the plaintiff have
acted differently, if he had known' - can be seen as a formulation
for causation in fact. The List test, however, is conceivably over-
129 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW 600 (1966).
Professor Loss' most recent comment regarding "privity" is worthy of note:
Again, more and more under the impact of Texas Gulf and Heit
v. Weitzen, on which the Supreme Court denied certiorari the other day,
and similar cases, we have a great problem that nobody can answer today:
the unexplored consequences of imposing liability on corporate insiders to
the market generally, without regard to traditional notions of privity.
I know it's fashionable for law professor's particularly to pooh-pooh privity
as a concept in deceit, and I have done it along with others, but when you
abandon the privity concept and make a director or officer liable to
everybody who has bought or sold in the market because there is a false
press release or a false report, or something of that sort, the potential
liability is, really, quite horrendous in relation to the crime, if it be a crime.
Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW.
27, 35 (1969) (citations omitted).
130 In Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1964),
Judge Lord, in speaking of the Farnsworth decision, said: "The language of the
district court in that case was: ' .. ..A semblance of privity .. . seems to be
requisite . . . .' I find it unnecessary to attempt a definition of this, at best, cloudy
phrase, for if 'a semblance of privity' means 'privity' '(like 'a little bit pregnant'),
I reject it."
131W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 748 (1964). See also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
132 See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
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broad. It is well enough to concentrate on reliance or causation alone
in cases where foreseeability and privity are never mentioned because
they are not a problem. In such cases - cases involving direct trans-
actions - one is dealing with people whose relationship to de-
fendant's action is clear and direct. However, difficulties arise in
attempting to go from those cases to cases of faceless, indirect non-
disclosure (or selective disclosure). In the latter cases the List test
could be answered in the affirmative by almost anybody. It is sug-
gested that the List test of reliance is not overbroad, however, if
a foreseeability test - Farnsworth's "semblance of privity" - is
coupled with it. This "semblance of privity" requirement, thus under-
stood, may, needless to say, bear less kinship to the classic concept
of privity of contract than it bears to the classic concept of fore-
seeability, viewed as an element of proximate or legal cause in the
law of torts."' 8 In any event, it should not be overlooked as an
available, and arguably appropriate, limiting doctrine in a context
where application of now established 10b-5 law in connection with
an indirect transaction might raise the specter of unlimited liability
to an unlimited class of plaintiffs. Moreover, it is also suggested
that limiting the extent of liability, an arguably valid consideration,
134
should not be so regarded as to preclude liability altogether.135
3. Persons Who May be Liable in Indirect Transactions
This subsection has not analyzed civil liability for violations of
10b-5 in terms of the three classifications of persons described in
section I supra - corporate insiders, first generation tippees, and
second generation tippees. It has been assumed for purposes of this
subsection that, if a violation were found on the part of a member
of any of these categories, concepts of causation, reliance and fore-
seeability would apply equally to each class of violators. 136 It would
seem that the legal criteria for determining a violation on the one
hand, and civil liability via causation, reliance and foreseeability, on
the other, ought to operate more or less independently.
E. Civil Liability for Tipping
The original question posed at the beginning of the Note is,
Can civil liability be imposed on one who "tips" -i.e., selectively
discloses material inside information to one who thereafter trades
233 For the suggestion that proximate cause ought to be required in 10b-5 cases see,
Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F.
Supp. 766, 775 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
134The courts view underwriting in its present form to be vital to the growth of
American industry. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
135 For a discussion of alternative limitations on extent of liability, see p. 480 infra.
136 Such a conclusion was reached in section IV(C) (4) supra.
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in the security in question? If so, under what circumstances can the
tipper be held liable, and to what extent?
The aspect of this question which has not been considered is
whether a person with inside information can be held civilly liable
for tipping.
It has been established that tipping is itself a violation of the
Rule." 7 However, no case has yet imposed civil liability for tip-
ping.'38 This subsection will consider various theories by which the
legal conclusion that civil liability might be imposed for tipping
might be reached.
1. Violation Plus Causation and Reliance
An orthodox theory that civil liability should exist whenever
a lob-5 violation occurs which causes the injury of another does
not on its face appear to be unreasonable. Applying the List test of
reliance, 39 the problem of proving reliance and causation and per-
haps foreseeability as well, should not be impossible for a prospective
plaintiff. There are two problems, however, which should be con-
sidered.
First, the tipper did not trade in the stock in question. Rule
10b-5 requires that the prohibited acts be performed "in connection
with" a purchase or sale of securities. 40 This problem, however, is
one inherent in finding a violation of the Rule, and it has been
assumed for purposes of this discussion that tipping is a violation.'
It is also probable that the tipper's tippees will have traded in the
stock, 42 thus providing a "connection" with a transaction, and,
even if they have not, it is possible to view the plaintiff's purchase
or sale which was "caused" by the tipper's selective disclosure as
sufficiently "connected with" the tipper's actions to establish a
violation.
The second problem is that any damages which were sustained
did not accrue to the benefit of the tipper- but rather accrued to
the benefit of the tipper's tippees."4 3 Although this may be a
legitimate objection, at least one case has sustained civil liability
3
7 See text accompanying note 43 supra.
138 Bromberg, TGS, supra note 21, at 746. For the nearest case so holding, see Ross
v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), noted in 70 SAN. L. REv. 347 '(1968).
139 See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
14
0 See text of Rule quoted in text accompanying note 16 supra.
141 See text accompanying note 137 supra.
142According to Bromber& "there can hardly be liability unless it [tipping violation]
results in some damage, e.g., through trading by the tippees." Bromberg, TGS, supra
note 21, at 746.




in the face of the objection. In Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co.,14 4 the
court, after rejecting the privity requirement, said, "[djefendant
Peat, Marwick, in independently auditing Thor's financial statement,
remains liable regardless of whether it had benefited from the sup-
posedly inflated market price. The position of an independent auditor
is different from that of other corporate insiders.' 1 45 Although the
position of an independent auditor may be different from that of
an underwriter, for instance, or that of a tippee who tips, the cases
holding independent auditors liable for fraudulent disclosure or
nondisclosure may provide initial theoretical justification for holding
someone liable who does not directly benefit from his tortious con-
duct. 4 ' The problem should be one of determining what sort of
duty is owed to the public by one possessed of inside information.
2. Aiding and Abetting
Another theory of liability applicable to cases involving tipping
is that of "aiding and abetting." This concept has evolved from the
law of torts and has been applied in 10b-5 cases. 147 The statement of
the theory was borrowed from the Restatement of Torts: "For harm
resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a
person is liable if he . . . (b) [k]nows that the other's conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or en-
couragement to the other so to conduct himself .... 148
The application of this theory to a set of facts can best be seen
in the case of Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.1 49 In
that case, replete with a complex set of facts, the defendant insur-
ance company was found to be an aider and abettor to a fraudulent
securities broker dealing in its stock, by referring potential customers
to the broker while knowing of the broker's fraudulent dealings.
The court found "that MULIC (Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.]
engaged in an affirmative course of conduct which aided and abetted
Dobich's violations of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.""1 0 The de-
144 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
145 Id. at 104-05.
14' For another case involving the lob-5 civil liability of an accounting firm who did
not trade in the securities in question but failed to disclose certain after-acquired
information relevant to a financial statement, see Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). Here the court sustained liability on the basis of an "aiding and
abetting" theory.
147 Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 708 (N.D. Ind.
1968). See also Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Fischer v. Kletz,
266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
'
48 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
10 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
150 Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
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fendant argued that it could not be liable for plaintiff's damages
because such damages would have occurred despite defendant's
conduct. The court rejected this argument stating that the notion
"that liability might ... result from aiding and abetting a violation
of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5- has continued to find accept-
ance in the courts." ' 1 Finally, the court observed that defendant
could also be found guilty of aiding and abetting by mere failure
to report the broker's fraudulent activities to the Indiana Securities
Commission.1
52
Analogizing the reasoning of the Brennan case to the situation
of an insider or tippee tipping another leads to a theory of liability
for tipping in certain circumstances. Where the insider or tippee tips
and pursues an affirmative course of conduct' 5 3 in assisting his tippee
(or second generation tippee) in violating the Rule,"' or fails to
report his tippee to proper authorities when he knows the latter
is violating the Rule, the tipper would be liable as an aider and
abettor of his tippee's violation. The application of this theory of
liability "cannot be confined to an abstract rule but must be fashioned
case by case as particular facts dictate."'
1 55
3. Vicarious Liability
Professor Bromberg has suggested another theory for holding
a person civilly liable as a tipper. His suggestion is analogous to
vicarious liability for tipping:
Although tipping is itself a violation [of Rule 10b-5], there can
hardly -be any liability unless it results in some damage, e.g., through
trading by the tippees. Given the nature of the financial world, an
insider who tips a friend should probably be charged with foreseeing
the friend will tell one or two others and that the information will
continue to spread. Quite conceivably he will be liable for all the
trades which can be traced to information emanating from him.
In the abstract, there is reason to hold the original tipper even
for trades by tippees which - because of the muted form in which
the information reaches the tippees - are not violations by them. If
the overriding policy is to prevent informational inuities in the
market, it would be served by such a rule, which would also operate
as a powerful deterrent to tipping.15 6
The theory rests on the tort principle of foreseeability, and would
probably require proof of a chain of causation running from defend-
ant to plaintiff. If a test of factual causation were to be employed,
151 Id. at 725.
1
5 2 Id. at 727.
13 It may be suggested that the mere act of "tipping" is sufficient "affirmative conduct"
to establish this element of aiding and abetting
254 For a discussion of first and second generation tippee violations of lob-5, see text
sections I (B-C) supra.
155 Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1963).
156 Bromberg, TGS, supra note 21, at 746 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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inequities might be prevented. Holding tippers liable for the actions
of their tippees might have the benefit of discouraging all forms
of dissemination of information in violation of the Rule, because
the sources of the information would be deterred from divulgence.157
While there is merit in holding a tipper liable in a private
action, care should be taken to assure that a defendant is not held
liable where his action (in disclosing or not disclosing) is innocent
and could result in no foreseeable harm.
CONCLUSION
The question raised at the beginning of this Note is, Can civil
liability be imposed on one who "tips" - i.e., selectively discloses
material inside information to one who thereafter trades in the
security in question? If so, under what circumstances can the tipper
be held liable, and to what extent?
The answer to this question is that no court has ever so held,
but the theoretical framework exists which would rationally justify
such a holding, even where the tipper's tippees traded in an indirect
transaction.
First, it was concluded that a first generation tippee could be
held civilly liable for a violation of lob-5, at least for a violation
involving trading in a direct transaction. Once a trading violation
of Rule 10b-5 has been established, the status of a person as an
insider, first generation tippee, or subsequent generation tippee
should not ordinarily be relevant to the question of imposing civil
liability on the person for his violation. The status of a violator
does become relevant, however, in considering the question of im-
posing civil liability for a tipping violation. The three theories by
which a "tipper" could possibly be held civilly liable- causation
and reliance, aiding and abetting, and vicarious liability-seem
to suggest that the tipper's liability depends upon his tippee's viola-
tion of lob-5. Although this reasoning is not absolutely necessary
to the causation and reliance liability approach, such reasoning
would raise the problem of determining a violation by the tipper's
tippee. If the tipper is himself a tippee, then his "subsequent gener-
ation tippee" would have to be found in violation of lob-5.
A second problem arises in attempting to hold a tipper liable
for his tippee's violation, if the tipper's tippee (or second generation
tippee) has traded in an indirect transaction. It was concluded,
however, that existing notions of causation, reliance and foresee-
ability, as well as the meager authority addressing the issue, would
not be offended by imposing civil liability on the basis of an indirect
157 Failure to Disclose, supra note 20, at 357.
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transaction, particularly if some limiting notion such as proximate
cause were retained.
Although no court has yet held an insider or tippee liable
for tipping- selectively disclosing material inside information to
subsequent generation tippees who trade the securities in question
in an indirect or market transaction - such a legal conclusion does
not seem to be beyond the realm of possibility or sound reasoning.
The major objection to such a holding is that the potential liability
could be unconscionable - unlimited liability to an unlimited number
of plaintiffs.
However, it is suggested that considerations regarding the
extent of liability should not necessarily preclude liability itself, so
long as there are alternative limitations on the extent of liability.
Several factors bearing on the damages question might be con-
sidered to reduce the extent of liability so that the total potential
recovery by all plaintiffs would be one which a court could
countenance.15
A court could:
(1) Include only the plaintiff's measure of actual damage
losses on shares bought during days when subsequent generation
tippees sold, and limit the number of shares upon which re-
covery could be based to the number the subsequent generation
tippees sold each day or the number plaintiff bought that day,
whichever was greater;
(2) Require that the damages question be decided in
an action wherein the subsequent generation tippees were
joined as parties, but only require for the plaintiff to
recover a showing that the subsequent generation tippees traded
in the relevant period, that they had received the tip, and that
they had reason to know it was inside information. This would
have the effect of mandatorily spreading the liability to more
of the culpable parties without making the burden on plaintiff
excessive.
(3) Limit recovery in the normal case to the amount
of profit actually realized. Provisions for punitive re-
158 An example of the method in which courts compute damages is the recent case in
Utah based on the facts of the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 92,494, (Civil No. 132-66) (D. Utah Oct. 17,
1969). In this case the court applied the "New York Rule" which determines that
the measure of damages in a stock transaction is "the highest intermediate value
reached by the stock between the time of the wrongful act complained of and a
reasonable time thereafter, to be allowed to the injured party to place himself in the
position he would have been in had not his rights been violated." The court deter-
mined a reasonable time to be 20 trading days, and then computed the average of
the high market prices on those 20 days to arrive at a figure to compute damages. Id.
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coveries could be provided to avoid the possibility of blatant
violations without recourse in cases where no defendants made
profits or the small profits made by the solvent defendants
are inadequate compensation for plaintiff's loss in light of
the nature and intent of defendant's violation.' 59
The question of damages should not, however, influence the
question of liability. Persons, whether insiders or first generation
tippees, who selectively disclose material inside information which
they know will cause trading based on the information, should be
held liable to those defrauded in the market by such a violation of
Rule lob-5. The more properly debatable question is to what extent




159 But in connection with the suggestion that punitive damages should be allowed, see
the arguably contrary holding in Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., [1967-1969
Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEc. REP. f 92,474 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1969).
indicating that punitive damages could not appropriately be allowed in an action
based on alleged violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which
parallels Rule i0b-5 in many respects.
*The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance and advice of Professor Glenn W.
Clark, University of Denver College of Law, and the assistance of Darryl G. Kaneko,
in the preparation of this Note.
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